What the Failed Recall in Taiwan Means for U.S.-Taiwan and Cross-Strait Relations
On Saturday, July 26, all 24 legislators from Taiwan’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) who were up for recall survived the vote, heading off an unprecedented effort to replace legislators elected just last year. The failure of the “Great Recall” campaign will likely embolden the KMT to fiercely oppose President Lai Ching-te’s agenda. It also raises an important unknown in U.S.-Taiwan relations and may lower the temperature of cross-Strait relations.
The Great Recall That Wasn’t
When Lai won the presidency in January 2024, his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost control of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan for the first time in eight years. The KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) formed a majority coalition and used their power to block many of Lai’s legislative priorities. Most notably, the KMT and TPP introduced major cuts to the government budget, including to defense. Additionally, they pushed to amend the Act Governing the Legislative Yuan’s Power, which would have significantly shifted power away from Lai and the executive and toward the legislative branch.
Supporters of the DPP viewed this move as unconstitutional and took to the streets, giving rise to the “Bluebird Movement.” Lai’s government appealed to the Constitutional Court, which ruled against many of the bill’s provisions. In response, the KMT and TPP rejected seven of Lai’s nominees for the Constitutional Court, eliminating the Court’s ability to rule on constitutionality. Paired with high-profile KMT visits to China, including those of former President Ma Ying-jeou and party whip Fu Kun-chi, a view emerged within segments of Taiwanese society that the KMT, in collusion with China, was undermining Taiwan’s democracy and destabilizing the island.
A grassroots movement emerged and collected enough signatures to force a recall of 31 of the KMT’s legislators. This was Taiwan’s first recall effort of such a vast scale and perhaps the largest recall campaign seen in any democracy. The objective was to take away the KMT’s plurality and flip the legislature, which could have been achieved with the DPP picking up six seats. In the end, though, the KMT held on to all 24 seats that were up for a vote (an additional seven KMT lawmakers will face recall votes next month).
An Emboldened KMT and Weakened DPP
Prior to the recall votes, there was plenty of finger-pointing within the KMT. Party insiders lamented that the KMT had failed to put a single DPP lawmaker up for recall (indeed, some KMT members have been indicted and others are under investigation for allegedly forging people’s signatures for recall petitions) and placed most of the blame on KMT Chairman Eric Chu. Had the recalls been successful, Chu would have likely resigned as Chairman, while Lai would have pushed through his legislative priorities (had the DPP captured a majority). Even if the DPP proved unable to secure an outright majority, with momentum from the recalls it would have had the upper hand in bargaining with the KMT.
The KMT, though, demonstrated that it still has a powerful political machine and can mobilize its supporters. Chu, for his part, may attempt to remain as chairman by pointing to the successful ground game that he oversaw. If he steps aside, there will be intense focus on the race to succeed him. Many observers believe the frontrunner to be Taichung Mayor Liu Shiow-yen, who is also seen as a potential 2028 presidential candidate. Others point to Chiang Wan-an, the Mayor of Taipei, as another candidate to lead the KMT and be its presidential nominee. Regardless of outcome, the result of the chairperson’s race will provide meaningful clues about how the KMT is going to position itself on cross-Strait relations, security, and U.S.-Taiwan relations in the next presidential election.
For the DPP, which did not start the recall movement but later embraced it, the results are a major setback. For the rest of his term, Lai will have to govern without controlling the legislature. The likeliest future is one of gridlock, with an emboldened opposition set on stifling his agenda. The results could, however, force Lai to compromise and attempt to find common ground with the KMT. Lai is also all but certain to soon be faced with substantial U.S. tariffs, which will put an even greater premium on his ability to craft a unified response with the other parties. To be sure, the KMT and TPP would need to reciprocate any such effort by Lai, and it remains uncertain whether they would be willing to do so. Nonetheless, Lai will need to demonstrate goodwill and extend an olive branch to the opposition as a first step.
Implications for U.S.-Taiwan and Cross-Strait Relations
The results have potentially major implications for Taiwan’s security. One key question concerns the fate of defense spending. President Trump has publicly called for Taiwan to dramatically increase defense spending from 2.5 percent to ten percent of GDP. In response, Lai pledged to raise defense spending to three percent of GDP this year and continue an upward trajectory. The KMT, though, could block increases to the defense budget. Such a move would significantly harm U.S.-Taiwan relations by giving the impression that Taiwan is not taking its defense seriously. A weaker, more vulnerable Taiwan could also embolden Chinese aggression.
On the other hand, the recall results could add some stability to cross-Strait relations. Following Lai’s election in January 2024, many prominent Chinese scholars attempted to find solace in the fact that Lai received just 40 percent of the vote, arguing that he lacked popular support and that had the other two candidates joined forces he would have lost. Had the DPP flipped the legislature, Beijing would have likely revisited those assumptions, concluding that the Taiwanese electorate continued to move away from it and that the KMT was a party in terminal decline. Now, though, Chinese observers may assess that Taiwanese voters favor a divided government as the best way to preserve the status quo. Beijing’s coercion of Taiwan and its attempts to undermine and isolate Lai will likely intensify, but it may also conclude that it can be patient and wait him out. The results of the recall campaign may also prompt Lai to conclude that the electorate wants a more moderate approach to cross-Strait relations and prompt him to adjust his policies, for instance by facilitating greater cross-Strait people-to-people and scholarly exchanges.
Last weekend’s recall votes will likely embolden the KMT to oppose President Lai’s agenda. Lai will have to adjust, demonstrating to Taiwan’s electorate that he is willing and able to work with the opposition to address the major challenges facing the island. Taiwan’s security will rest on the ability of Lai and the KMT to find common ground and work together. Whether they will be able to do so, however, is an open question.
