The United States and South Korea Are Allies and Trade Partners. Will They Reinforce Ties at Their Summit?

U.S. President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung are scheduled to meet on August 25 in Washington, DC, to discuss U.S.-South Korea trade and defense cooperation amid several potential shifts in their bilateral relationship.
The meeting comes off the heels of the Trump administration’s announcement of 15 percent tariffs on South Korean imports in late July, lower than the previously proposed 25 percent. It’s also happening days after the start of the two countries’ annual large-scale joint military drill in South Korea, known as Ulchi Freedom Shield, which aims to strengthen defense readiness against North Korean threats.
Before the visit, Lee will be meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru in Tokyo to shore up bilateral ties; analysts suggest the two might seek to hedge against potential U.S. withdrawal from security commitments in the region. The leaders will focus on deepening the Japan-South Korea relationship as well as strengthening trilateral cooperation with the United States to promote “regional peace and stability,” according to a Korean presidential spokesperson.
The Trump-Lee summit is the first of its kind since the start of Trump’s second term and Lee’s snap election win in June. Here’s what to expect.
What are the main goals for Trump and Lee going into this meeting?
Reinforcing the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Lee’s central focus for the summit will likely be fortifying the U.S.-South Korea alliance, the most critical defense relationship for Seoul, according to CFR Distinguished Fellow Matthew P. Goodman. “At the highest level, the mission for President Lee is to reassure President Trump that the Korean alliance is solid and that the Koreans are ready to work with the United States on a range of issues, from national security to commercial [interests],” Goodman told CFR.
Lee has advocated for “pragmatic” diplomacy that aims to bolster South Korea’s alliance with the United States while recalibrating its relationship with other regional partners such as Japan, as well as increasing cooperation with China and Russia. Some U.S. analysts fear that Lee’s approach might tilt South Korea closer to China, despite Lee’s desire to maintain a balanced foreign policy strategy.
Stabilizing economic ties. Another of Lee’s top priorities is safeguarding South Korea’s economy at a time of unpredictable U.S. trade decisions, global supply chain concerns, and worsening U.S.-China relations. The July tariff deal included a commitment by South Korea to contribute $350 billion in U.S.-based investments and to purchase $100 billion in U.S. liquified natural gas. Trump announced on social media in July that the two are likely to iron out the details of the investment during their meeting. A Korean spokesperson said in mid-August that the leaders will use the summit to advance their partnership in the manufacturing sector—including semiconductors, batteries and shipbuilding—critical minerals and technology, and safety regulations for auto imports.
However, Goodman noted Lee is likely to downplay tariff issues during the summit to ensure that Seoul and Washington agree to bolster their defense alliance in the face of existential threats in the Korean Peninsula.
Modernizing the defense alliance. The two leaders are expected to discuss “modernizing” their security alliance to address the growing North Korean’s growing nuclear threats and Pyongyang’s deepening reliance on Russia, as well as China’s threat to a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” according to USFK Commander General Xavier Brunson, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), at a press briefing last week. Separately, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said the country would be open to increasing its defense budget if it provided an “opportunity to cooperate” with the United States and ensured investment in research and development.
Negotiating defense cost-sharing. Experts say Trump will seek greater contributions from South Korea for shared defense costs, at least informally if not explicitly in an agreement. This would align with the administration’s foreign policy strategy of renegotiating global leadership costs and burden-sharing arrangements.
According to internal government documents seen by the Washington Post, the Trump administration wants Seoul to boost defense spending to 3.8 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP)—up from 2.6 percent in 2024—and to increase its contribution toward the approximately 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea beyond the $1 billion it currently allotts. South Korea’s 2025 defense budget, which accounts for 3.6 percent of GDP, is already a more than 63 percent increase from a decade prior.
How are Trump’s tariffs factoring into the U.S.-South Korea trade relationship?
According to the most recent data, South Korea is the United States’ sixth-largest trading partner. The bilateral trade in goods and services was estimated at nearly $240 billion in 2024, an 8 percent increase from 2023. The United States ran a $66 billion trade deficit—importing more than it exported—with South Korea in 2024, whose economy heavily depends on exports.
In 2007, the two countries signed the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement (KORUS FTA), which took effect in 2012. It’s the second-largest U.S. FTA by trade flows (after the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement) and eliminates or reduces virtually all tariffs on manufactured goods, agricultural products, and services.
That the White House’s 15 percent tariffs on South Korea would bypass the FTA “highlights why Trump’s trade policy is so disconcerting to many trading partners,” Goodman said. Overturning a formal trade agreement that’s been approved by both countries could set a dangerous precedent that calls into question the certainty of other legally binding trade documents, let alone the recent framework agreements such as the one announced between the United States and South Korea in late July, he argued.
What changes to the countries’ security alliance could be discussed?
Recent reporting suggests that the Trump administration sees China as a higher-priority threat in the Indo-Pacific than North Korea—a shift that South Korean policy circles have been keeping an eye on.
The documents released by the Washington Post stated that one of the Trump administration’s goals is for Seoul to release a political statement in support of repositioning the USFK to better deter China in addition to North Korea. In May, the Wall Street Journal reported that the administration was considering plans to redeploy some 4,500 U.S. troops from South Korea to Guam and the first island chain to prepare for potential conflict with China. Although a Pentagon spokesperson refuted the reports, researchers have noted that Trump has long questioned the utility of U.S. troops in South Korea, even before he entered politics.
Both sides are going to try to furiously prevent potential disagreements on China, says Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Korea Chair Adjunct Fellow Katrin Fraser Katz at an August press briefing. “The South Korean side will really be trying to minimize any type of divergence on strategic flexibility,” when it comes to reposturing troops, she adds.
Lee’s overtures to the United States come as he has sought to reduce military activity along the Korean border, with the goal of restoring the so-called Comprehensive Military Agreement between the two Koreas that was abandoned by both sides in 2024. Korean analysts say Trump could be a critical part of future deescalation efforts; Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un fostered a friendship during Trump’s first term, and Trump became the first U.S. president to step foot in North Korea. But Washington will need tacit support, and ideally active cooperation, from Beijing to rein in Pyongyang, writes CFR Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow Shuxian Luo for Foreign Affairs.
Since returning to the White House, Trump has demonstrated interest in re-engaging in diplomacy with Kim, though North Korean spokesperson Kim Yo-jong has rejected any discussion of nuclear disarmament.