The Last Days of Thailand’s Shinawatra Dynasty
The political turbulence currently engulfing Thailand’s Pheu Thai-led coalition government now has led to a no-confidence vote planned in parliament this week. This will be a no-confidence measure launched by Pheu Thai’s former coalition ally, the pro-military Bhumjaithai Party, which has quit the ruling coalition. The Constitutional Court is also going to hear a motion against Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, while this week the top Shinawatra, Thaksin Shinawatra, faces the beginning of his trial on lese majeste charges from a decade ago, which had until recently seemed buried.
The no-confidence vote, the lese majeste trial, the many governing mistakes made by political novice Paetongtarn, the growing anger in the powerful military against Thaksin, the head of the family dynasty, for increasingly meddling in military (and possibly monarchical) affairs, the rise of parties more progressive than Pheu Thai which make Pheu Thai less useful to the crown, and other problems together raise a critical question.
After twenty-five years of the Shinawatras dominating Thai civilian politics, and controlling multiple elected governments while also sometimes jousting with the military and monarchy, do these events—the withering of Paetongtarn and Thaksin, the Shinawatras’ decline in public opinion and military opinion, a possible break with the king?—mark the final days of the Shinawatras’ influence on Thai politics? Don’t forget, Paetongtarn is really the last viable Shinawatra who could hold a top elected office now, as several analysts have noted. If she’s gone, there really is no one else left on the list.
Although the family has weathered numerous challenges in the past, changing party names at times, the convergence of internal fractures among its backers and sustained external pressures from powerful Thai actors now suggests the dynasty is done for.
Several factors suggest that this time, the Shinawatras may be cooked. A political novice who would not be prime minister if her last name was anything but Shinawatra, Paetongtarn has angered many Thais by seeming to have just been handed the top job. This public anger is spreading toward the entire Shinawatra family, as Thais grow weary of dynasties and many also feel that, while earlier Shinawatra prime ministers (Thaksin, Yingluck, even Somchai) had real experience in government and/or significant political skills, the younger Shinawatras have neither. Even back in March, before she made grave mistakes, over sixty percent of Thais did not have confidence in her government, at a time when Thailand faces serious challenges like slow growth, youth unemployment, and the potential effects of high U.S. tariffs on the kingdom.
This incompetence, anger at special treatment, and feeling of their-time-is-over even affects views of Thaksin, whose massive charisma has gotten him out of difficult situations in the past. He previously was regarded as a savvy politician and a deal-making populist—he did indeed, as prime minister between 2001-2006 pass important laws like universal health care that helped many Thais and made him extremely popular.
Thaksin returned to the country in 2023 after years in exile after a 2006 coup and seemed to have made his latest great deal, offering his party, quietly, as a shield against progressive forces while getting reconciliation with the king and the military. As we noted in a prior piece about him: “Upon returning to Thailand, Thaksin was taken into custody and sentenced by the Supreme Court to eight years in prison for conflict of interest, abuse of power, and corruption during his time in power. He was found guilty of these charges in absentia during his exile. However, as part of a possible deal with the monarchy to secure parliamentary power for Pheu Thai, Thaksin received a royal pardon, reducing his sentence to one year. He spent the majority of his jail term in a luxurious hospital, citing an unknown illness. In February, he was released from the hospital and became a free man after being given home release by the Ministry of Justice to complete his sentence.
Thaksin clearly thought his old lese majeste charges were no longer meaningful, now that he had made up with the king and army. And Pheu Thai, a party once known as progressive and looking out for all Thais, managed to form a government in 2023 led by Paetongtarn. It achieved a ruling coalition by expressly keeping reformists out of power and allying with pro-military parties.
Despite Pheu Thai taking actions that destroyed the main progressive party and created a coalition close to the army, the family, and particularly Thaksin, seemingly can no longer function in Thailand at the same time as the current military and monarch. At times under the rule of the king’s father, Rama IX, Thaksin, the palace, and the military were able to function together. That seems impossible now: Thaksin’s return to politics has reminded the military and royalists that, despite aging and looking privileged, he retains more charisma than any other civilian politician and still could be powerful and dangerous.
As Paul Chambers (yes, the one recently charged with lese majeste and forced to flee the country) presciently wrote last year: “Throughout 2024, Thailand remained a defective democracy dominated by two levels of elites — the palace-controlled security apparatus and the Shinawatra political dynasty. This asymmetrical relationship between the palace and Thaksin seems based upon mutual interests—but also Thaksin not overstepping what royals perceive should be his limits.”
And by meddling too much in the military and royal affairs, Thaksin has done just that, overstepping his limits while also giving royalists and military leaders a taste of his remaining political muscles. He has angered the military by his many solo attempts at regional diplomacy, like becoming an informal advisor to Malaysian leader Anwar Ibrahim or trying to play a role in mediating the civil war in Myanmar, in part by hosting Anwar and Myanmar’s junta leader in Bangkok
Thaksin and Pheu Thai served the military and palace in the 2023 election by forming a ruling coalition that kept the more progressive Move Forward party out of parliamentary power, but that move weakened Pheu Thai’s popular support and undermined its populist image, particularly among younger, urban, and disillusioned voters Many of the people fleeing Pheu Thai are too young to remember Thaksin’s period as prime minister, when he dominated politics and culture in the kingdom like no other civilian leader and passed not just health care but almost a Thai “New Deal” of important policies (while also degrading democracy and allowing massive extrajudicial killing in the deep South.) The electoral coalition – poorer people from the north and northeast and some urban middle class progressives –that underpinned Shinawatra dominance for two decades is shattered. A decline in loyalty to Thaksin’s personal authority among party elites, could further accelerate the collapse of his party and his personal power.
A younger generation of voters now prioritize authentic democratic reform over simply replacing one elite with another. Meanwhile, conservative and royalist factions, historically unable to secure lasting electoral victories, are now emboldened by the Shinawatras’ perceived weaknesses.
Beyond domestic challenges, Thailand’s foreign policy environment has added more instability and further damaged the Shinawatra brand. In particular, the escalating tensions with Cambodia have highlighted the government’s vulnerability. A leaked phone conversation, in which Prime Minister Paetongtarn reportedly acknowledged to Cambodia’s former prime minister Hun Sen that the Thai military opposed her and she also criticized the army, has intensified concerns about Thailand’s civil-military relations and made her look weak. At the same time, Hun Sen’s unusually direct criticism – saying that the prime minister criticized Thailand’s king — of the Shinawatras, long close to him, has further weakened the Thai government. And given Thaksin’s undeniable role as the architect of the current administration, such attacks from a neighbor amplify perceptions that the current government is weak on national security and internally fragmented.
It would be an oversight to assume that the Shinawatra network will survive all these pressures, with its leader twenty-five years past his prime and a lack of other capable other party bosses. While the family still commands some electoral loyalty in the North and Northeast, this support base is being tested by Pheu Thai’s move against Move Forward and the lack of tangible economic gains under the current administration. Thaksin, long known both for his charisma and for his effective political maneuvering, seems to have run out of moves to make.
In the coming weeks, the Shinawatra dynasty faces perhaps its most decisive test to date. The combined effects of intensifying legal pressures on both Thaksin and Paetongtarn, waning popular support, and growing hostility from the military and palace, create an extremely tough landscape. Although the family’s deep social roots and Thaksin’s proven political skills remain important assets, these alone are not likely to be enough.
Instead, Paetongtarn likely will be the last Shinawatra prime minister, and Thaksin will be gone from Thailand by next year. The lese majeste case against Thaksin, or a new Constitutional Court case against Paetongtarn, could be strategically used to neutralize their influence, putting them in jail or (more likely) letting them flee, never to return. Or, if the situation in Bangkok becomes increasingly unruly and violent, the military may stage a coup, and force the Shinawatras to flee as a junta takes command.
Either way, the country is now at potential inflection point that could resolve the long-standing “Shinawatra question” with a definitive decline of their political relevance. As Thailand moves forward, this outcome may represent a fundamental reconfiguration of its political order, with far-reaching implications for the nature of electoral competition, civil-military relations, and democratic governance in the years to come.
