Thailand: Slip Sliding Away From the United States

This piece is part of a Council on Foreign Relations analysis series assessing the geopolitical effect of the Trump administration’s tariffs policy on select countries in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ahead of the trade bloc’s summit. Joshua Kurlantzick is senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia at CFR.

President Donald Trump’s tariffs and broader U.S. policy could exacerbate several of Thailand’s economic challenges and accelerate the kingdom’s strategic realignment toward China. Indeed, Bangkok—a treaty ally with Washington—has gradually grown closer to Beijing over the past decade.

U.S. sanctions and criticism over a 2014 coup—the thirteenth successful overthrow in modern Thai history—in part sparked this drift away from close U.S. ties. Washington’s response infuriated the Thai military at the time, which along with the country’s technically constitutional but extremely powerful monarch, has historically been the most important actor in the country. Since then, the Royal Thai Army has increased joint exercises with China, which had said little about the coup. And, with support from a royal family long close to Beijing, the military has also shifted in multiple ways that expand other ties to China. Out of the major economies in Southeast Asia, Thailand has arguably cultivated the closest relationship with China since 2014.

Meanwhile, over the past twenty-five years, Thailand has been embroiled in political turmoil that has pitted the military and royalist establishment against a series of populist political parties headed by or linked to former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (who is now in jail over graft and abuse of power charges). While Thaksin and his party have been weakened due to its fateful decision to ally with pro-military parties in the prior parliament and to his current imprisonment, the political chaos and other challenges to the army/royalist establishment will likely continue. A parliamentary election is supposed to be called in the coming months, and the People’s Party (PP), more progressive and populist than Thaksin’s parties, could win a majority of seats.

This political unrest has already done damage to Thailand’s economy, preventing coherent policymaking, deterring investors, and driving talent out of the country. An analysis by consultancy McKinsey & Company concluded that Thailand’s growth rate has lagged behind that of Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore for the past four years. 

Now, the White House has imposed tariffs on Thailand (19 percent on exports and 40 percent on transshipped goods), which came after acrimonious bilateral negotiations while Thailand detained a leading U.S. academic. These tensions have led to a chilling effect that could derail Thailand’s growth and damage a longstanding and essential U.S. relationship in Southeast Asia.

A deeper economic and political freeze

The prior cooling toward the United States had mostly been driven by the Thai palace, the military, as well as elites with longstanding business ties to China. Now, public opinion is becoming more negative about aspects of U.S.-Thai relations, according to multiple civil society leaders and polling. A study by Milieu, a research firm based in Singapore, that was conducted after the Trump administration took office found that three quarters of Thai citizens expressed some level of concern or serious concern about the new U.S. tariffs. They also held an overwhelmingly pessimistic view of how U.S. tariffs will affect Thailand’s economy.  

They are right to be concerned. According to a recent report produced by the UN Development Program, Thai exports to the United States are projected to contract by 12.7 percent in the long term because of the tariffs. Several key sectors—automobiles, electronics, and food products, including both agricultural and meat products—are particularly vulnerable to tariffs.

While the public’s unease about U.S. policies does not necessarily translate into public support for China, Beijing appears to have won more hearts and minds in Thailand over the past year. China is boosting investment and aid into the kingdom, while the United States has slashed its international aid, a critical source of soft power. Beijing has also invested massively in cultivating support among the Chinese diaspora in Thailand through a range of soft power tools, including expanding Chinese state media cooperation with Thai news outlets, Chinese government support for cultural performances in Thailand, and other programs.

Political shifts and public opinion about the United States, combined with the White House’s approach to Thailand, could mean that Thailand’s future leaders move even further away from U.S. ties. If the PP–which favors issues with significant popular backing like reforming the military and laws protecting the monarchy as well as constitutional change—wins an absolute majority of parliament’s lower house in the next election and is allowed to take power, it could cause a seismic shock in domestic Thai politics.

A parliament with PP in control also could be a challenge for the current Trump administration. PP members and leaders’ strong opposition to the most recent coup and demands for the military to play a smaller role in domestic politics could make them uneasy with a president who warmly welcomed Thailand’s coup leader, Prayuth Chan-ocha, to the United States during his first term. Greeting Prayuth at the White House, Trump made no mention of the military’s takeover of power. (As the Associated Press noted at the time, “it’s not that unusual for U.S. presidents to meet autocrats in the Oval Office, but coup leaders are more contentious.”)

Strategic effects: bilateral, regional, and global

While U.S. defense leaders across the political spectrum have worried since the 2014 coup that Thailand might no longer be a reliable place to base U.S. forces in the case of a regional conflict, this view has only grown more prevalent in the U.S. defense establishment in recent years. Meanwhile, in private, some senior Thai military leaders will no longer commit to providing base access for U.S. forces in the case of a regional conflict, according to interviews with Thai general officers.

But the Pentagon will need to rely on Thailand’s bases if the United States wants to succeed in any regional conflict, and it certainly cannot afford to lose Thai bases if there were a conflict with China.

Obtaining basing rights will get even more challenging if U.S.-Thai relations become more acrimonious and transactional. Thailand still holds several large military exercises with the United States, but as noted above, it is boosting its exercises with China, too. Bangkok has also increasingly bought more arms from China than from the United States—a trend that likely will increase with poor U.S.-Thai bilateral ties. This shift toward Chinese arms will potentially undermine U.S.-Thai joint operability in any regional crisis, a development to which the Pentagon seems to be paying little attention.

Less U.S. influence in Thailand and broader mainland Southeast Asia—on top of Thailand’s own political instability—is also making it harder for the kingdom to play its traditional role as a stabilizing force in Southeast Asia. For instance, Thailand has continually missed opportunities to temper the ongoing civil war next door in Myanmar. This is contributing to the collapse of that state, which has become a nexus of organized transnational crime, and is sending large numbers of refugees into Thailand.

For Thailand—and the world—that could mean the conflict in Myanmar becomes even more balkanized and dangerous, spreading more crime, disease, migration, and other major challenges that eventually find a way to cross borders. With the White House paying far less attention to this war and the region, the broader geopolitical impact of U.S. tariffs is having an outsized effect that leaves Thailand, despite its reservations about being too dependent on China, looking to Beijing for solutions.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.