South Korea’s Democracy Remains Vulnerable
Duyeon Kim is an adjunct senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security and a visiting professor at the Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies. She is based in Seoul.
Yoon Suk Yeol was the second president to have enraged the South Korean people and been removed from office. The first time was in 2017 when the Constitutional Court upheld the National Assembly’s impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye, who had entrusted the country to a close, corrupt friend who did not hold a government position. Yoon shocked the democratic nation by declaring martial law. Both presidents embarrassed their people by making South Korea look like a backward, underdeveloped country.
Public anger at Yoon’s martial law attempt had an added and unexpected dimension, however. Unlike during Park’s impeachment, public sentiment was quickly divided, along ideological lines, on his fate. Anti-impeachment protests grew larger over time. Most of these protestors were not condoning Yoon’s action but rather they opposed the way he was held accountable. Others protested the real prospect that their country could be governed next by progressive politician Lee Jae-myung, the head of the main opposition party. Koreans knew on the night of martial law that another presidential impeachment and snap election loomed large. Lee lost to Yoon in the 2022 presidential election by only 0.7 percent. Understanding Korea’s ideological division and its legal procedures are important to understanding how two separate processes to indict and remove a Korean president from office shaped public trust, or distrust, in their democratic institutions and elected leaders.
South Koreans across party lines agreed that Yoon was wrong to even consider martial law. He certainly should have used the power of persuasion through politics to build public and legislative support for his agenda. Yoon miscalculated, following the modus operandi of prosecutor generals who typically operate unilaterally and authoritatively. Many South Koreans would agree with Yoon’s assessment of “anti-state forces” within the country and even his claims of North Korea’s invisible hand in South Korean affairs. These were the basis of the “national emergency” that prompted him to declare martial law. But very few South Koreans agreed with his prescription.
Democratic institutions eventually prevailed in impeaching and removing a president who employed an undemocratic tool. To be sure, democracy won the day in this recent upheaval. However, the months leading up to the Constitutional Court’s verdict revealed three areas of fragility, indicating that South Korea’s democracy remains vulnerable. Fierce ideological divisions still infuse politics, which could impede South Korea’s chances to grow into a truly mature democracy. Relatedly, what initially began as a fight across party lines for the formal adjudication of the president’s behavior quickly devolved into a scramble for political power and a battle of values. The weaponization of political dominance in the legislature as well as stark differences in interpreting Korean laws and procedures are also factors of vulnerability. South Korea will need to work on these factors because the stakes are high.
Evidence of Fragility Alongside Strength
The fragility and strength of South Korea’s democracy were equally visible during Yoon’s martial law attempt. Fragility was demonstrated by essentially two people—President Yoon and his defense minister, Kim Yong-hyun—who were needed to declare martial law, and thus the possibility of greater crises for South Korea. However, resilience prevailed that night with democratic forces pushing back. Politicians across the political spectrum, including the head of Yoon’s own party, successfully entered the National Assembly and voted in the middle of the night, legally requiring Yoon to reverse his order. South Korea’s police and military were not aggressive. Korean media maintained its press freedom and watchful activism. Civic groups upheld their ability to protest.
Another evidence of strength was in the Constitutional Court’s unanimous decision on April 4. While South Koreans were at loggerheads in the months leading up to its verdict, it found Yoon guilty of violating the law and the Constitution seriously enough to require his removal from office. Two previous presidential impeachments, one in 2004 (impeachment dismissed) and a second in 2017 (impeachment upheld), created the impression that the Court tends to be swayed more by public opinion than by the letter of the law. The Korean media reported at length on speculation and concern that a divided public this time would tempt the justices to simply vote according to their own political preferences. Tensions between elected politicians and the public ran high. However, civic protests ended immediately and peacefully upon news that all eight justices unanimously agreed to remove Yoon from the office.
On the other hand, the events immediately following the lifting of martial law exposed more weaknesses than strengths in the country’s laws, democratic practices, and institutions. Conservatives cited the lack of due process and the rule of law as well as flaws in democratic institutions and their legal procedures. They believed that these flaws resulted from a system rigged in favor of progressives. They were also outraged by continued political coercion from progressive lawmakers, who dominate and control the National Assembly, for impeaching their Prime Minister and Acting President, even coming close to impeaching the next Acting President, throwing the country even deeper into instability. Progressive lawmakers had already taken full advantage of their dominance—they previously impeached twenty-seven government officials, forcing their immediate suspension, and refused to approve government budgets after Yoon took office in 2022. These were the main factors Yoon cited in his decision to declare martial law. While progressives may have acted within their legal voting rights, their actions nevertheless demonstrate the weaponization of politics to destroy political opponents and paralyze the government.
Progressives were further enraged when Yoon challenged the rule of law by resisting law enforcement procedures to question and arrest him—in a process separate from his impeachment process—on criminal charges of insurrection. Yoon claimed these processes and procedures violated the law, but the progressives wanted him behind bars immediately and blamed democratic institutions as inadequate to the task of challenging his power. Some progressive politicians have even demanded that Yoon be executed for instigating an insurrection for his martial law attempt, which further demonstrates the deeply destructive nature of Korean politics.
Different Interpretations of Legal Process
Koreans have a saying that “You have to begin by placing the first button [on a shirt] correctly.” In Yoon’s case, conservatives and many legal scholars claimed that the first button was not placed correctly after the National Assembly impeached him. They claimed that a criminal investigation and judicial process cannot be conducted for a sitting president before the Constitutional Court makes its verdict, pointing to the previous presidential impeachment case. The main progressive party reported Yoon for allegedly causing an insurrection and abusing his power, which put the criminal investigation in motion as a separate but simultaneous process. Demonizing Yoon with the help of the criminal court’s guilty verdict would be a win for their party.
Conservatives and many legal scholars also claimed that the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO) does not have the legal authority to investigate, issue an arrest warrant, and execute an arrest of those charged with insurrection. This would constitute the “first button” for Yoon’s case, which they claim voids the rest of the law enforcement and judicial process. Their rationale supports Yoon’s refusal to be questioned and taken by CIO investigators for his arrest at the presidential residence. Yoon eventually relented during their second attempt. Conservatives, legal scholars, and even Yoon himself claim that only the police have authority to handle insurrection charges. While this may be legally correct, skeptics still wondered if Yoon would have abided if the police had taken the lead. Legal experts sympathetic to Korea’s progressives certainly have different views.
The CIO and its corresponding laws were created by the previous progressive Moon Jae-in government, when progressives controlled the legislature, to weaken the power of South Korea’s prosecutors. The CIO reshuffled the jurisdiction of specific cases among the police and prosecution and required them to report to the CIO. Since its establishment, the anti-corruption agency has been widely regarded as incompetent and understaffed.
Nonetheless, the CIO won the turf battle to take the lead in Yoon’s insurrection charge. Critics claim that progressive lawmakers reported Yoon to the CIO because the agency’s officials lean left-of-center. The CIO was also criticized for requesting Yoon’s arrest warrant at the wrong court to allegedly find a progressive judge who would grant the warrant. Still, some experts argue that Yoon should have honored the warrant despite the apparent flaws in court procedures.
Meanwhile, public debate over the legitimacy of legal proceedings surfaced when the Constitutional Court hearings were broadcast. Allegations were made that Yoon was not properly granted the right to defense at times. Questions about the integrity of the acting chief justice were raised, as well as debate over the adequate separation of powers among the three branches of government. Some even criticized the Constitutional Court for rushing the hearings.
Despite the intense politicization of the moment, this confusing interpretation of South Korean laws, due process, and procedures can also be attributed to the imprecision of the country’s laws. Legal scholars across the political divide agree that South Korean laws tend to be imprecise. While debate is certainly one of the cornerstones of democracy, a clear-cut process should be in place for all citizens to follow, including the president.
Fighting for Power vs. Democracy
In the months leading up to the Constitutional Court’s verdict, political parties openly put their own spin on Korean laws and sought to create narratives that benefited their interests with the public. Partisanship was also evident among the public as Korean citizens tried to press law enforcement agencies and legal institutions to make decisions their favor. In contrast, legal experts fiercely debated definitions and the legalities of rules and procedures to penalize Yoon’s martial law attempt.
Months of pro- and anti-impeachment protests were about much more than a president defying democratic norms. Progressives have been fighting against what they perceive to be a dictatorship and insurrection and fighting to win the snap presidential election. Meanwhile, conservatives have been fighting against a future in which a progressive government, which they perceive to be sympathetic to communism.
The legislative and judicial branches certainly upheld democratic norms by checking the executive and removing a president who attempted to undermine a democracy’s “cooperative public decision-making.” Yet South Korea’s democracy remains vulnerable. An imperial presidency draws resistance. Imprecise laws invite amateur interpretations. A fierce ideological divide colors even the most obvious flaws in existing democratic institutions and practices. While conservative and progressive governments accuse each other of being undemocratic, both have exhibited a penchant for authoritarian practices.
Perhaps Yoon’s miscalculation will jolt the country into strengthening its democracy. Perhaps it will also sharpen the Korean people’s understanding of changing domestic and foreign threats to their national security. This constitutional crisis was certainly tumultuous for South Korea, and its second presidential impeachment was a tragedy for the country regardless of one’s political loyalties. On June 3, the Korean people will have the opportunity to choose a new president. The campaign should reveal just what lessons have been learned. The outcome will impact the health of Korea’s democracy with implications for its alliance with the United States.
