Putin Courts a ‘Global Majority’ From Russia

This piece is part of a Council on Foreign Relations analysis series assessing the geopolitical effect of the Trump administration’s tariffs policy on select countries in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ahead of the trade bloc’s summit. Stephen Sestanovich, the author, is the George F. Kennan senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies at CFR.

No idea has a larger place in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric than the claim that his country is shaking up the political, economic, and military hierarchy of international relations. In his view, a newly assertive “Global Majority” now challenges the old Western-led system, which he complains was characterized by “monologues, endless preaching, and orders.” Putin has made good use of this theme in recent months, but the fall of 2025 may show how few real benefits it is producing for Russian diplomacy.

The idea that a “polycentric” world is taking shape gained strength from a series of high-level meetings last summer, among them summit gatherings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the BRICS, the Eurasian Economic Forum, and the crowd of leaders that descended on Beijing to celebrate the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Each event highlighted Putin’s personal escape from diplomatic isolation, as well as the increasing Asian tilt of Russian foreign policy. And each suggested that the United States—paying the price for U.S. President Donald Trump’s confrontational trade policies—was itself becoming isolated. 

Upcoming events and developments may tell a different story. Putin himself cannot attend either of this fall’s two biggest multilateral events—the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea at the end of October, and the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in South Africa in late November. In each case, the reason will be the same: his indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC), of which both South Korea and South Africa are enthusiastic backers. Putin can rail against the international order’s oppressive “rules,” but his “Global Majority,” it turns out, actually likes some of them.

A second problem is Russia’s increasingly precarious economy. While predicting steady global growth, the International Monetary Fund recently halved its 2025 gross domestic product (GDP) forecast for Russia; Putin’s own ministers have talked about a possible recession this year, with “stagnation” to follow. He has had to renege on a 2024 promise not to increase taxes; energy export earnings are down; gasoline rationing is in place in many cities; and, because inflation remains high, so are Central Bank interest rates—still an astronomical 17 percent.

Economic prospects vary across the entire Global South, of course, but Russia’s outlook means Putin cannot aspire to leadership on economic issues, even in the energy trade. With its partners in the BRICS, Russia will increasingly become a price-taker in oil and gas markets. Last week’s announcement of U.S. sanctions on the biggest Russian oil companies will, at a minimum, enable India to demand still deeper discounts on any crude oil it continues to import; while reducing its own imports, China may also continue to stall the construction of the oft-delayed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline.

Even if Putin could attend this year’s APEC summit (he will send an obscure deputy prime minister instead), he would discover a third uncomfortable truth about the way the hierarchy of international relations is changing. In the three decades since its first meeting, APEC has been transformed by China’s historic growth, and this summit—like many before it—will put U.S.-China talks at center stage. Every leader present at APEC will want to see whether the meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping goes well. 

Yet the fact that China has become the most important trading partner for almost all countries represented at the summit does not mean that they are simply trying to figure out how to position themselves between Washington and Beijing. What Putin would see at APEC is that the most important leaders present hope to strengthen their relationship with Trump. More than ever, they want the benefits of security cooperation with the United States. This will be true of long-standing allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines; almost-allies like Singapore; and fence-sitters like Vietnam and Indonesia. None of them look to Russia to bolster their security. Even if these states cannot resolve their tariff disputes with the Trump administration, the standoff offers few policy opportunities for Putin. (Russia’s marginal role in APEC may explain why, long before he discovered the “Global Majority,” and long before he was indicted by the ICC, Putin did not always attend these summits.)

The growth of Chinese power, by perpetuating interest in security relationships with the United States, has postponed the emergence of a “multipolar” system from which Putin hopes to benefit. The same is even more true of his war against Ukraine—and this is the fourth factor undermining Putin’s talk of a new global order. Had he not launched his war in 2022, Trump’s hostility to NATO and his tariff war with the European Union would have done far more to shatter Western unity in 2025. Instead, the spectacle of a Russian army on the march has brought the United States and Europe closer together. Had he not indulged his desire for conquest, Putin would be much closer to the “polycentric” world he dreams of creating.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.