On India-Pakistan Conflict, The United States Needs to Tread Carefully

Manjari Chatterjee Miller is a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, and professor of international relations and Munk chair in Global India at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto.

India’s military strikes across Pakistan today were not surprising. A response was widely expected following the killing of twenty-six tourists in an April 22 attack in Indian-administered Kashmir claimed by a terrorist group based in Pakistan. The government of Narendra Modi was under intense pressure from Indian media and citizens to respond. But the military exchange and the level of rhetoric on both sides are different this time. This raises concerns that the tensions could move beyond the last major escalation in 2019, which followed the bombing of a bus full of Indian paramilitary soldiers in Pulwama, Kashmir.

The Resistance Front (TRF) claimed responsibility for both attacks. TRF is a proxy for the Lashkar-e-Taiba, an Islamist terrorist group headquartered in Pakistan—and allegedly supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency— that is on the United States’ list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The 2019 Indian response was a retaliatory strike on a terrorist training complex in Balakot, Pakistan.

A Change in India’s Response

Despite the TRF targeting Indian civilians in this round of attacks, and the massive pressure on the Modi government to retaliate, India took two weeks to respond. This suggests that Indian policymakers were carefully considering all options to avoid a debacle, as well as preparing for the risks of escalation.

The Balakot strikes in 2019 had not been a clear “win” for India. India claimed a large number of militants were killed, but Pakistan disputed India’s casualty estimates. Furthermore, an Indian pilot was shot down and captured in Pakistani territory. Balakot did not result in further escalation as both sides claimed victory, and the Indian pilot was unharmed and returned to India within forty-eight hours.   

This time around, the Indian government issued civil defense warnings before the strikes, ordering states and provinces to conduct mock drills, implement emergency blackout measures, and operationalize air raid warnings. The strikes, when they came, were much wider than in 2019 —they were conducted against nine sites in Pakistan that the Indian government claimed were associated with terrorist camps and infrastructure. Pakistan reported more than twenty deaths from the Indian strikes, while Indian officials reported at least twelve killed by Pakistani shelling.

Perhaps most importantly, the reprisal attacks showed the Indian government will not hesitate to respond to terrorist attacks on its soil using conventional forces. That is, the possible threat of the use of low-yield nuclear weapons by Pakistan is not going to be a deterrent. And India will not spend time attempting to convince the international community that Pakistan was behind the attacks—after a previous terrorist attack in 2016 in Pathankot, India invited Pakistani investigators to conduct joint investigations.

Religion-Charged Rhetoric

There is also a religious tinge to the unfolding events that was absent in 2019. While Lashkar-e-Taiba and other such outfits are known Islamist terror groups, this time, religious symbolism has been present in the rhetoric of the two governments.

A week before the attacks near Pahalgam, General Syed Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, addressed cadets at a graduation ceremony and alluded to the “two-nation theory.” This is a religious nationalist concept dating back to pre-1947 that claimed the Indian subcontinent could never emerge from British colonial rule as one unified country because it comprised two entirely separate nations, one Hindu and one Muslim. This religious nationalism was the founding framework of Pakistan. Munir even called Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state that was violently partitioned between India and Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan’s “jugular vein,” or essential to the very existence of Pakistan— a concept seen by India as highly inflammatory.

For its part, the Indian government named today’s strikes “Operation Sindoor.” The name is noteworthy because sindoor is a bright red powder that is worn by Hindu women in their hair as a symbol of marriage. Many of the Hindu victims in the April 22 attack, including a naval officer, were honeymooning in Pahalgam. After the strikes, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh posted on X, “Victory to Mother India.” His invoking of India as the mother goddess is rooted in Hindu beliefs and mythology.

The U.S. Dilemma

The crisis unfolding in the subcontinent poses steep challenges for U.S. policymakers. Before the strikes, the Donald Trump administration sent mixed messages in its response. President Trump expressed condolences after the terrorist attacks, Secretary of State Marco Rubio called for “de-escalation” a few days ago, while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the United States “stood in solidarity” with India and “supports its right to defend itself.”

Thus far, there has been no condemnation of the strikes from the administration— President Trump called the rising tensions a shame, while House Speaker Mike Johnson said the United States supports India in its fight against terrorism. For its part, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval called Secretary Rubio shortly after Operation Sindoor unfolded, underscoring the importance of India’s relationship with the United States.

If the United States government were to be seen as either unsupportive of India or interfering in any way in Kashmir, it would be a serious setback to the U.S.-India partnership. But the risk of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbors is also real.

The United States’ relationship with Pakistan is at an all-time low, giving it limited leverage over the country. Meanwhile, it remains to be seen how China will respond, and how far it will support Pakistan publicly—what it will do privately is anyone’s guess, especially given that China itself is worried about the threat of Islamist groups. The Trump administration now needs to consider incentives it can offer both countries if the conflict escalates further. A war in South Asia, whether low or high level, would be highly detrimental to U.S. interests.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.