China in the Indo-Pacific: April 2025
China Holds Conference on Relations With Neighbors: In the lead-up to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to mainland Southeast Asia, China convened a rare meeting of its Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries. A statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed its relations with neighbors are “at their best in modern times” and “entering a critical phase of deep linkage between the regional landscape and the world changes.” The meeting emphasized China’s commitment to prioritizing neighboring countries as relations between major powers, namely the U.S.-China relationship, continue to deteriorate.
Xi Visits Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia: Following U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, Xi’s tour of Southeast Asia promoted China as a more reliable partner and emphasized the need for regional unity in the face of economic confrontation and disruption. Trump originally levied some of his highest tariffs on Southeast Asia, with Cambodia facing a 49 percent rate, Vietnam closely behind at 46 percent, and Malaysia at 24 percent. Trump later paused the “reciprocal” tariffs for ninety days and imposed a universal 10 percent rate on global imports. Xi’s visit from April 14 to 18, though planned before the tariff announcement, was dominated by coverage of China’s outreach to the region amid the United States’ economic threats.
On his first stop in Vietnam, Xi said the Chinese and Vietnamese governments should “jointly oppose hegemonism, unilateralism, and protectionism.” The meeting was Xi’s second visit to Vietnam in the last eighteen months. He signed forty-five cooperation agreements with the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Tô Lâm, on issues ranging from supply-chain integration to railways.
One agreement related directly to the Trump administration’s rationale for levying high tariffs on Vietnam. The announcement promised to increase coordination between the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which designates rules of origin for export products. Vietnam benefited from the first Trump administration’s efforts to decouple U.S. economic interests from China, with many U.S. firms such as Apple, Intel, and Nike shifting production to countries in Southeast Asia. Now, the Trump administration views Vietnam as a backdoor conduit for Chinese exports to the United States. Vietnam has promised to crack down on Chinese transshipments, but Trump accused Xi and Lâm of scheming to “screw” the United States in their meeting. Vietnam faces a difficult balancing act of ingratiating itself with the Trump administration while maintaining its relationship with China.
Next, Xi called for the region to band together and “jointly resist the undercurrents of geopolitical and camp-based confrontation, overcome the countercurrents of unilateralism and protectionism” in Malaysia. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim noted China is Malaysia’s most significant trading partner and lauded China as a “rational, strong, and reliable” ally; Anwar has visited China three times since he became prime minister in 2022. While in Kuala Lumpur, Xi signed thirty-one memoranda of understanding, pledging to boost cooperation on issues from tourism to agriculture. As China diversifies its economy to insulates itself from U.S. tariffs, analysts suggested Malaysia’s burgeoning high-tech industry makes it an appealing export market for Beijing. Xi last visited Malaysia in 2013.
On his final stop in Phnom Penh, Xi proclaimed, “Cambodia is a priority in China’s neighborhood diplomacy” and urged Cambodia to “resist protectionism.” After a meeting among Xi, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, and longtime former leader Hun Sen, the countries announced thirty-seven cooperation agreements, covering agriculture, education, finance, health, information, investment, tourism, trade, water resources, women’s affairs, and youth work. The leaders also confirmed $1.2 billion in funding for the long-embattled Funan Techo Canal, which will link the Mekong River to the Gulf of Thailand. Although Cambodia held a groundbreaking ceremony for the project in August, construction was suddenly halted a few days later. Reuters reported in November that Cambodia’s partner, the state-owned China Road and Bridge Corporation, had expressed misgivings about the project’s financing. This was Xi’s first visit to the country since 2016.
Cambodia Deports Taiwanese Scam Victims to China: Just prior to Xi’s visit, Cambodia deported what it termed “Chinese criminals,” including 180 Taiwanese citizens, to China. The human trafficking victims were coerced into the large scamming industry in Southeast Asia, where people are lured under the false premise of a lucrative job offer and are forced to conduct online scams in compounds. When asked about Cambodia’s decision to deport Taiwanese nationals to China, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson praised Cambodia for following its One China principle. Xi reiterated his request that Cambodia suppress scam centers during his visit. However, the Cambodian political and economic elite are involved in and profit from the scamming industry, and Hun Manet is highly unlikely to substantively tackle the issue.
Earthquake Aftermath in Myanmar and Thailand: As residents in Myanmar and Thailand dealt with the fallout from the 7.7-magnitude earthquake that hit the region on March 28, China’s complicated regional presence continued to play a role.
China was one of the largest donors to Myanmar’s relief efforts, pledging $13.76 million in supplies and sending six hundred rescue workers. Although the ruling Myanmar junta stated it welcomed all foreign assistance, junta troops fired warning shots at a Chinese Red Cross convoy bringing relief supplies to Mandalay, Myanmar. The junta claimed the convoy had not notified its government that it was entering an active war zone and that the trucks did not stop. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said the aid workers were unharmed but called for the safety of volunteers and unobstructed access to facilitate aid efforts.
In Thailand, fallout from the earthquake exposed China’s complicated development role in the region. Although Bangkok was located hundreds of miles from the earthquake’s epicenter, a thirty-story building collapsed. The building was in the process of being constructed by the state-owned China Railway No. 10 Engineering Group to house Thailand’s State Audit Office. Nearly all of Thailand’s earthquake fatalities were workers inside the building when it collapsed. According to reporting by the New York Times, workers at the site said that the building materials were of poor quality. After the collapse, Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra ordered an investigation into the dozen other buildings currently under construction by China Railway No. 10. Thailand arrested the Chinese national overseeing the building’s construction for violating its Foreign Business Act, which bars foreign nationals from holding a majority stake in a business. Thai investigators allege the Chinese national used three Thai citizens as stand-ins for other foreign owners.
Chinese Delegation Oversees Handover of Lashio to Myanmar Junta: China continued to play a pivotal role in Myanmar’s civil war by pressuring one of the major ethnic armed opposition groups, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), to relinquish territory it had previously seized from the junta last August. China originally supported the opposition group’s battle against the junta when it launched a rebel offensive in October 2023. As the MNDAA continued to make gains against the junta, however—crucially capturing the junta’s northern military headquarters in Lashio, Myanmar, on the border with China—the Chinese government began to change its tune. Toward the end of 2024, China exerted pressure on the MNDAA, an ethnic Chinese group, to cease its campaign against the junta by instituting a blockade of the region. Beijing announced it mediated a formal ceasefire between the two parties in January. China sent Special Envoy Deng Xijun and a team to Lashio to monitor the ceasefire and the MNDAA’s withdrawal from the area. Ye Myo Hein, an analyst with the Southeast Asia Peace Institute, suggested that China’s “double game” in Myanmar’s civil war, wielding influence and placing pressure on both the junta and opposition rebel groups, serves Chinese goals of maintaining a weakened country that it can control.
China Claims Sandy Cay in Spratly Islands: China claimed it had “implemented maritime control and exercised sovereign jurisdiction” over Sandy Cay in the Spratly Islands—the first official declaration of sovereignty in the South China Sea in a decade. China planted its flag on Sandy Cay, which is located near a Philippine military installation, days after the Philippines held a coastal defense and island seizure drill with the United States. The Chinese forces left the next day, and there is no evidence that China has permanently occupied the sandbank. The Philippines sent navy, coast guard, and maritime police officers the following day to reassert its sovereignty over the territory. Manila said it landed on three sandbanks, and published a photo of its soldiers planting a flag on a sandbank that mimicked Beijing’s photo. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Sandy Cay’s classification as a rock allows the controlling nation to claim the surrounding territorial sea, giving the sandbank geostrategic importance disproportionate to its size.
Cambodia Unveils Upgrade of Ream Naval Base: Hun Manet held a ceremony to commemorate the expansion of Cambodia’s largest naval base. The upgrade, largely financed by China, will enable the port to host larger ships and include a dry dock. Hun Manet also presented the new China-Cambodia Ream Naval Base Joint Support and Training Center to support joint operations on counterterrorism, disaster prevention and relief, and humanitarian assistance. Ream Naval Base has long been perceived by the United States as a potential strategic outpost for China, although China disputes that characterization. To combat the perception that China is given preferential access, Cambodia hosted the Japanese navy for the first foreign visit since the upgrade.
Indonesia Commits to Maritime Security Cooperation With China: In the first iteration of the China-Indonesia joint foreign and defense ministerial dialogue, the two countries agreed to work together on infrastructure-building, minerals development, and joint security in the South China Sea. The statement follows Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s controversial visit to Beijing last November, in which the joint statement appeared to depart from Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy stance. Despite Indonesia never previously acknowledging its competing territorial claims, the November statement said China and Indonesia shared a “common understanding” on territorial claims in the South China Sea and pledged “joint development in areas of overlapping claims.” China’s illegitimate “nine-dash line” claims to most of the South China Sea overlap with Indonesia’s two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone, and China has recently encroached on Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.
Indian Tariff on Chinese Steel Imports: India imposed a 12 percent temporary tariff on some steel imports, known as a safeguard duty, to curb a surge in cheap steel shipments. The tariff is primarily aimed at China, which in 2024 was the second-biggest exporter of steel to India following South Korea. India’s Steel Minister H.D. Kumaraswamy said that the move will “provide critical relief to domestic producers, especially small and medium-scale enterprises, who have faced immense pressure from rising imports.”
China’s Ambassador to India Urges Multilateralism: Chinese Ambassador Xu Feihong gave his first interview to Indian media, striking an optimistic tone on future relations between the two countries and emphasizing that “China and India are partners rather than rivals.” In response to a question on U.S. tariff policies, he highlighted the United States’ “bullying and hegemony.” He drew China and India’s roles as the “leading major economies” and “key members” of the Global South who “have the responsibility to oppose all forms of unilateralism and protectionism.” Furthermore, he pointed to the two countries’ global leadership and their responsibility to “inject much-needed stability into a turbulent world.”
Bhutanese Government Uses “Xizang” to Refer to Tibet: In a recent statement regarding a Tibetan cultural performance in Bhutan’s capital of Thimphu, the Bhutanese government used the term “Xizang” while referring to Tibet. Its actions included a reference to the performers as a “Chinese cultural troupe” and the event as a “Chinese cultural performance.” The statement sparked criticism from Tibetan leaders and advocates who assert that the word contributes to China’s efforts to erase Tibet’s historical and cultural identity. Tibet’s government in exile, the Central Tibetan Administration, responded with a request that the Bhutanese government “refrain from using terms like Xizang.” In 2023, China replaced “Tibet” with “Xizang” on official documents.
Nepal’s Struggles With China-Built Airport: Nepal’s parliamentary committee released a report regarding their investigation into the country’s Pokhara International Airport, which was inaugurated in 2023 and constructed with a $216 million loan from China. Pokhara has struggled to attract regular international flights, raising concerns about its financial viability and the country’s ability to service the debt.
The work for the airport was done by China CAMC Engineering, the construction arm of the Chinese state-owned conglomerate Sinomach. The investigation discovered irregularities worth over $100 million worth of misappropriations through inflated procurement costs, contract breaches, and negligence in financial oversight, among other issues.
To be built, the airport used a twenty-year loan from the Export-Import Bank of China, a state-owned lender. Though Nepal must begin to repay the loan, the airport has not met its projections for international passengers. There is currently one weekly international route a week, a Himalayan Airlines flight. The airport’s limitations, such as its position in difficult terrain, accommodates only certain narrow-body planes and effectively has only one operating runway. Geopolitical barriers also hinder flights; during the airport’s inauguration, the Chinese ambassador to Nepal said the project had been built as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. While Nepal appears to reject that sentiment, Indian airlines have also not added any routes to Pokhara. In August, Nepal’s government requested China convert the airport loan into a grant, but no formal agreements have yet taken place.
India and Boeing Airlines: Air India is looking to purchase Boeing planes rejected by Chinese carriers as it continues the airline’s revival. The move aligns with broader efforts to revitalize Air India and meet rising domestic and international travel demand.
Recent reports suggest that although Indian carriers are struggling with aircraft acquisition amid global supply-chain limitations, they could benefit from U.S.-China trade tensions. Some 737 Max jets in China have since been sent back to the United States. Boeing’s CEO said that “due to the tariffs, many of our customers in China have indicated that they will not take delivery.” As of March, Air India has accepted forty-one Boeing 737 Max jets that were originally intended for Chinese airlines but deferred since the aircraft’s 2019 grounding.
Reactions to the Pahalgam Attack: China supports an “impartial investigation” into the recent Pahalgam terror attack, in which militants linked to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taib killed twenty-six tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir. A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement highlighted ties between China and Pakistan, referring to China as Pakistan’s “ironclad friend” and “all-weather strategic cooperative partner.” Additionally, Chinese Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that, particularly as China is a neighbor of both India and Pakistan, that it calls on both sides to “exercise restraint,” solve differences through “dialogue,” and “jointly keep the region peaceful and stable.” China says it “welcomes all measures” that will help “cool down the current situation.”
Advancing the Bangladesh-China Relationship: Bangladesh-China relations continue to develop following a recent engagement between Bangladesh’s Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus and Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen. Both countries spoke to the need for momentum on goals regarding infrastructure, trade, health care, and culture. Wen emphasized, “We do not want to wait another two to three years just to sign agreements—we want to implement them quickly.”
There was substantial progress made in trade, with new plans for mango and jackfruit exports and the procurement of four new vessels from China. Yunus advocated for expanding jute exports and called for increased Chinese investment in Bangladesh’s locomotive sector. The discussion sought to strengthen cultural ties, including proposing a Chinese Cultural Center and Language Institute and announcing progress toward a direct Kunming–Chattogram flight. Additionally, health-care cooperation was a central theme, with China reaffirming its commitment to constructing a one-thousand-bed hospital in Bangladesh and expediting medical visas for Bangladeshi patients.
The meeting confirmed an upcoming visit of China’s Commerce Minister Wang Wentao to Bangladesh along with a hundred-member delegation of investors seeking investment opportunities.
