China in Europe: April 2025
Trump Tariffs: The April 2 “Liberation Day” tariffs by Washington (and the subsequent reversal) took Europe by surprise. After President Donald Trump’s original tariff rate of 20 percent on the European Union (EU) was reduced to the universal 10 percent, Brussels opted to put their counter-tariffs on hold for ninety days. The EU’s proposed response package included a 25 percent tariff on diamonds, eggs, poultry, and many more U.S.-produced goods to take effect later in 2025. Although the 20 percent rate was reduced, Trump’s 25 percent levy on steel, aluminum, and cars from the European Union remains in place. Trump has additionally threatened to add European pharmaceuticals to the higher tariff rate. With rising European animosity against the United States, China has seen an opening to cooperate with the EU to counter the United States. Even before “Liberation Day,” China-Europe relations were improving: at the end of March, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič visited China and met with the country’s Vice Premier He Lifeng, Minister of Commerce Wang Wengato, and Customs Minister Sun Meijung. The trip’s stated purpose was to improve China-EU trade and investment relations, likely in anticipation of Trump’s tariffs. According to the European readout of events, the two sides covered “overcapacity and subsidies,” “market access barriers for many European products,” and “the need to level the playing field for EU companies in China.” China is keen to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, and the China-funded Global Times bragged that visiting European officials “have sent a unanimous signal of cooperation with China.” At a meeting with British Foreign Secretary David Lammy, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attacked the United States for using tariffs “as a weapon to launch indiscriminate attacks on various countries.” Wang made explicit his calls for an anti-Trump alliance with Europe: “As the two pillars and two major markets of the world economy, China and Europe should shoulder international responsibilities, jointly defend the multilateral trading system, and jointly build an open world economy.”
China’s Charm Offensive: China-Europe relations have thawed in the aftermath of Trump’s tariff volley. President of the European Commission (EC) Ursula von der Leyen struck an optimistic note on China-EU relations after she described a “momentum of steady growth” in bilateral ties following a phone call with Chinese Premier Li Qiang. After a visit to Beijing, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called China an “essential partner” and declared that “Spain is in favor of more balanced relations between the European Union and China, of finding negotiated solutions to our differences, which we have, and of greater cooperation in areas of common interest.” Most notably, China and the EU are reportedly in the “final stages” of lifting Chinese sanctions on several members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The members were originally targeted by China in 2021 in response to their criticism of Chinese policies in Xinjiang against the Uyghur population. Of the MEPs on China’s sanction list, four remain in the European Parliament—Michael Gahler (European People’s Party—Germany), Raphaël Glucksmann (Socialists and Democrats—France), Ilhan Kyuchyuk (Renew Europe—Bulgaria), and Miriam Lexmann (European People’s Party—Slovakia)—while one has left Brussels—Reinhard Butikofer (Greens—Germany). China also blacklisted the parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights and the EU Council’s Political and Security Committee. The current sanctions relief plan does not specify whether all the sanctions will be lifted or only those for sitting MEPs. According to an EU spokeswoman, Brussels had no plans to reciprocate sanctions relief given that conditions in Xinjiang had not improved: “The EU has not observed changes in the human rights situation in China/Xinjiang. Therefore, the Council maintains the China/Xinjiang-related designations.”
Investment Agreement: The initial exchange of sanctions between China and the EU over Xinjiang in 2021 derailed the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between the China and the EU, and sources suggest China’s recent charm offensive is an attempt to resurrect the deal. Reviving the CAI is unlikely to succeed, and in 2023 von der Leyen made clear the agreement would need to be renegotiated: “You know our position. We started negotiations round about 10 years ago and concluded the comprehensive agreement on investment two years ago. A lot has happened since then.” The original deal attempted to ensure fair treatment for European companies in China and agreed to alleviate points of trade friction between China and the EU, such as concerns over state-owned companies, industrial subsidies, and forced technology transfers. China’s recent sanctions relief is largely symbolic and is unlikely to have much effect on the future of the CAI.
Redirected Chinese Goods: Although Trump’s tariffs could potentially pull China and Europe closer together, the tariffs could end up pushing the two sides further apart. As Chinese goods are rerouted away from the United States, European firms fear a deluge of Chinese manufacturing in their markets. “When the U.S. shuts the door, some of that overflow heads our way,” warned one senior EU official. Von der Leyen also raised concerns about the “indirect effects” of Trump’s tariffs on China. The EC announced a new task force to look for signs of Chinese dumping. Europe’s renewable energy sector is most alarmed that Chinese solar panels, wind turbines, and (most of all) electric vehicles will swamp local competitors. European steel manufacturers have also raised concerns about Chinese dumping, and France has already called for measures to protect the industry after French steel producer ArcelorMittal announced job cuts. The Dutch steelmaker Tata Steel similarly announced it would cut 20 percent of its workforce this month in response to fierce Chinese competition.
China-Europe Diplomatic Summit: EU leaders plan to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in late July for a second China-EU summit. The meeting will again take place in Beijing, even though the previous summit was also held in the Chinese capital and, according to protocol, the location was expected to rotate to Brussels . The break in protocol is apparently due to Xi’s unwillingness to travel to Brussels. According to the South China Morning Post, the Europeans spent months trying to entice Xi to come to Brussels, but the Chinese leader was adamant. Trump’s hostility to the continent evidently pushed the Europeans to concede on protocol. Xi’s snub particularly stings given that the Chinese president agreed to visit Moscow to celebrate May Day with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Diplomatic Tensions: China’s military drills around Taiwan also provoked concern in Europe this month, as the foreign ministers of the Group of Seven made a statement expressing “deep concern about China’s provocative actions” around the island. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte also visited Tokyo this month to forge closer defense ties with Japan. Rutte told a press conference, “China is supporting Russia’s efforts. China is building up its armed forces, including its navy, at a rapid pace. We cannot be naïve, and we really have to work together, assess what is happening.” Another worrying sign in China-Europe relations came in February, when the Chinese government appointed Lu Shaye as China’s special representative for European affairs. Lu was formerly the ambassador to France and gained notoriety as a so-called wolf warrior who once said the former Soviet states “have no effective status in international law.”
Death of Pope Francis: Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te did not attend the funeral of Pope Francis, despite Vatican City being one of the few remaining states to recognize Taiwan. Instead, former Taiwanese Vice President Chen Chien-jen attended as Taiwan’s special envoy. Pope Francis worked closely with China and reached a controversial agreement with the Chinese government to accept its input in the appointment of Catholic bishops in China. Following the pope’s death, a spokesperson for the Chinese government said, “China and the Vatican have maintained constructive engagement, conducted useful exchanges, and had extensive communication on international issues.”
British Security Ties: The British Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin confirmed he met with Liu Zhenli, chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department of the People’s Liberation Army, in Beijing. Reports on the discussion were light on detail, but the leaders reportedly “discussed a range of security issues and agreed that in an unstable world we must play our part as responsible nations with global interests.” The meeting was the first visit by a British military leader to China in a decade. This month, the British Royal Navy’s carrier striker group HMS Prince of Wales also set off for an eight-month deployment in the Indo-Pacific to “reinforce its commitment” to the region. The Chinese Global Times criticized the action as “imperial nostalgia.”
British Industrial Dispute: The United Kingdom passed emergency legislation to nationalize the last blast furnaces of British Steel after the Chinese owner Jingye warned that they would be closed. Members of parliament in Westminster accused the Chinese ownership of engaging in industrial sabotage to kill Britain’s steel production. In response, the Chinese embassy accused British politicians of “anti-China rhetoric” and said they displayed “arrogance, ignorance and twisted mindset.” Members of parliament have called for China to be barred from owning key national infrastructure, such as water treatment and energy providers. “This is a country which is committing genocide and where there is slave labor, the forced sterilization of Uyghur women . . . They are about to dump steel, electric cars and batteries into our country,” said former Conservative Party leader Sir Iain Duncan Smith. China is heavily invested in British infrastructure, including a 10 percent stake in Heathrow Airport, 75 percent ownership of the sewage treatment facilities Northumbrian Water Group, and complete ownership of UK Power Networks, which manages electricity distribution in London and southeastern England. Chinese firms are also heavily invested in British nuclear power stations. The UK government recently blocked China’s ownership of an Essex nuclear power station and further pledged to avoid Chinese-produced solar panels as part of its planned state-owned energy company (Great British Energy), given the slave labor China used to produce polysilicon sourced in Xinjiang.
