Beyond Thailand, Transnational Repression Spreads Globally

In a recent post, I noted how Thailand has increasingly become the Southeast Asian hub of transnational repression. Across mainland Southeast Asia, transnational repression—of political activists, refugees, and others—has spiked over the past decade.

As I wrote in that post: “Human Rights Watch has noted [that] Thailand has become a ‘swap mart’ of dissidents from other regional states, who pay Bangkok back by targeting Thai critics living in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.”

But Thailand is part of a broader trend. Thailand is the most powerful state in mainland Southeast Asia, and, as a quasi-democracy that harshly represses certain types of activists, such as  those critical of the monarchy, it has become, regionally, the transnational repression giant. Globally, however, states with broader reach can not only copy some of Thailand’s methods but also utilize repression far beyond their own home regions.

Increasingly, the world’s biggest powers, including China, India, and others, are improving their methods of transnational repression to attack activists, writers, and other civil society figures in the world’s developed democracies, many of which are far from these powers’ own borders.

The trend has been building for at least a decade.  I wrote about aspects of China’s transnational repression  in my 2022 book Beijing’s Global Media Offensive: China’s Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World. But this trend—highlighted by Chinese, Indian, Russian and Turkish transnational repression—is gathering pace faster and faster.

In the past three years alone, there have been notable signs of this trend of increasing transnational repression. Such signs show that major powers may be willing to brazenly use their intelligence agencies or other methods to attack activists and others who offend the state almost anywhere, even at the risk of straining bilateral ties with the countries where these attacks take place.  

In one high-profile incident in 2023, the Canadian government accused India of playing a role in the assassination of Sikh separatist leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia. As NPR reported at the time: Nijjar “was a prominent leader in the Sikh community in Surrey, which is a suburb of Vancouver. Nijjar was considered really an outspoken advocate for creating an independent Sikh state in India’s Punjab region. And the Indian government called him a terrorist. He was shot dead just outside one of the main Sikh temples in Surrey. And two masked gunmen were seen running away. You know, his killing really sent a shockwave of fear through the Sikh community because it did appear to be targeted.” Following the Canadian government’s claims, bilateral relations went into a deep freeze that is still barely thawed.

Similarly, while China was engaging in transnational repression of all range of government opponents back in 2022, and in countries ranging from Burma to Belgium, China has gotten much better at global repression since then. Indeed, the latest report of the United Nations’ Human Rights Council, released about a month ago, notes a significant number of cases of Chinese transnational repression.

In significant part because of the rising transnational repression facilitated by China and other autocrats, the report concludes: “Allegations of transnational repression across borders have increased, with examples from around the world. Targeted repression across borders appears to be growing in scale and sophistication, and the impact on the protection of human rights defenders and affected individuals in exile, as well as the chilling effect on those who continue to defend human rights in challenging contexts, is of increasing concern.”

At the same time, the second Donald Trump administration has devoted less resources to tracking and combating foreign malign actors than its predecessors did; the current Justice Department, for instance, has disbanded the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Foreign Influence Task Force.

Meanwhile, concerns about the safety of intelligence shared currently with the United States, given an administration that has mistakenly given reporters access to classified information via Signal chats and that has a Director of National Intelligence perceived by some as sympathetic to Russia, has led key intelligence partners including Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, all part of the “Five Eyes” elite intel-sharing network (a network whose members are not supposed to spy on each other), to sometimes hold back on providing the U.S. with information about a range of subjects. DNI Tulsi Gabbard has, for her part, refused to share intelligence on Russia-Ukraine negotiations with other members of Five Eyes, which does not help bolster information sharing either.

This confirmation of holding back information comes according to intelligence officials from Five Eyes countries other than the United States. Subjects with less information-sharing today include potential activities inside the United States by foreign actors including China and Russia.

And like the United States, many developed democracies are so focused on other issues that they are not watching for Chinese transnational repression, especially when it occurs on the state and local level. Britain and many European countries have found their police systems, local and national political systems, and physical infrastructure influenced and corrupted by China. They also have witnessed a wide range of surveillance of Chinese dissidents on British and European soil, as well as surveillance of leading U.K. and European politicians, and theft of critical state secrets.

They also, of course, have witnessed—especially in the United Kingdom—a long string of Russians who have defied Vladimir Putin dying in Britain under mysterious circumstances. Yet Britain and Europe still seem no better prepared to anticipate Chinese or Russian transnational repression, and remain somewhat conflicted in even investigating such repression because they still court major trade ties with China and, until recently, Russian inflows of cash.

Indeed, the world’s biggest transnational repressors now have it better than ever: They have gotten really good at what they do, they are improving collaboration with other autocrats, and the defenses against their actions are weakening almost everywhere in the world.