Why Thaksin Was Acquitted of Lese Majeste
Only months ago, many rivals of Thai political power broker Thaksin Shinawatra, analysts of his influence in the kingdom (including myself and co-author Pavin Chachavalpongpun), and dissatisfied former members of his political base among the poor in the north and northeast all believed that Thaksin’s power—and that of his family and party—was waning. Many were convinced he might be forced to leave Thailand or even jailed on lese majeste charges awaiting him. These charges, stemming from an interview with Korean media 10 years prior that supposedly included comments defaming the monarchy, could have led to fifteen years in jail if Thaksin had been found guilty. They hung over him after he returned to Thailand from exile in 2023, and he ultimately had to face trial on them this summer.
Yet yesterday morning Thai time, Thaksin was acquitted on these selfsame charges. An acquittal on lese majeste charges is extremely rare in Thailand. Indeed, nearly ninety percent of such cases, if they come to trial, result in guilty verdicts for the defendant. In high-profile cases, the percentage of guilty verdicts is closer to 100.
Why then did Thaksin, an increasingly divisive figure whose political strength is ebbing, walk free? There are several possible explanations. One is that despite the army’s anger with Thaksin’s attempts at one-man diplomacy in Myanmar and other countries, as well as the mistakes made by his daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra as prime minister, the military and King Vajiralongkorn have realized that there is no better ally in parliament than a coalition led by Thaksin’s Pheu Thai party.
Right now, parliament is at a standstill. If a snap election were called because no lasting coalition could be found, it is likely that the progressive Move Forward party, which wants significant reforms of the military and monarchy, would win an outright majority – a result anathema to the army and palace. After all, Pheu Thai has lost supporters over the past year by not aligning with Move Forward and instead building a majority with pro-army parties. Meanwhile, if the king encouraged parliament to try to form a new coalition, one without Pheu Thai, such a coalition would need to be led by Move Forward, the only other party with a large number of seats. Again, a no-go for the army and the king.
Keeping a coalition in parliament headed by Pheu Thai instead—even an incarnation less popular than it has been in the past—ensures that there will be no parliamentary efforts to scrutinize the actions of the army and palace, let alone try to reform these institutions. A free Thaksin can lead that coalition. Yet at the same time, since Thaksin has been pushed into allying with pro-military parties, his influence and power have diminished overall in Thailand, which pleases the military.
For now, too, a placid parliament—which doesn’t have to face a new election until mid-2027—may mean the military does not have to launch a coup in order to maintain dominance, though that option is still out there.
Leaving Thaksin free also creates a level of chaos and anger in Thailand that may be what the king wants, according to a highly-connected expert in Thailand focusing on royal and military politics. Civilian political chaos leads Thais to focus on Thaksin and parliamentary games, reducing people’s bandwidth to focus on some of the king’s dubious actions, including directly intervening in politics, taking personal control of the Crown Property Bureau and its $30 billion worth of assets, and treating women around him poorly.
It also creates divisiveness that might actually open up Thailand’s stale politics, create a less feudalistic society, and ultimately reduce the power of the monarch. Some, including the expert with deep ties to senior military, think the king wants Thais to ultimately reform this system, and is taking some of his unpopular actions to undermine the constitutional —but actually absolute —Thai monarchy. With Thaksin still standing, progressives —the heart of Move Forward —will be furious. But so too will archroyalists who surrounded the king’s father, hate Thaksin, and who are not fans of the current king.
These royalists, and a broad group of upper-middle-class Thais, may indeed embrace electoral democracy in the future. They are realizing that this supposedly constitutional monarch, generally hated by the Thai public, has, because of Thailand’s unique monarchical situation, as much, if not more, power than his father, who was publicly beloved and less interventionist. They will further understand that there is no guarantee that future monarchs will be less divisive and unpopular than King Vajiralongkorn —they could be even more disliked and more politically assertive.
Many countries in relatively recent history had constitutional monarchs that wielded real power behind the scenes, if not the level of power enjoyed by Vajiralongkorn: Belgium, Bhutan, Britain, Cambodia (at times), Japan, and Spain. All of those countries are now truly constitutional monarchies, and Thailand is not so unique that it couldn’t make this transition. (There are still powerful monarchies in the world, but these royals, mostly in the Middle East, generally make no claims to be constitutionally limited; they rule absolutely.)
Many young Thais already want to create a truly constitutional monarchy. Perhaps, as middle-class Thais see that electoral democracy is better than the current Thai system, they too will push the monarchy to become like the emperor of Japan or the king of the United Kingdom.
